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9 
CONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CANON: THE METONYMIC EVOLUTION OF 
FEDERALIST 10 
Ian Bartrum* 
What is the connection between what I have called languages, 
functions from strings of sounds or marks to sets of possible 
worlds, semantic systems discussed in complete abstraction 
from human affairs, and what I have called language, a form of 
rational, convention-governed human social activity? 
  David Lewis1 
David Lewis’s question about the connection between 
“semantics” and “language-as-practiced” is, I think, analogous to 
the question at the center of this discussion, which is: how are we 
to understand the connection between constitutional text and 
constitutional meaning?2 Recent and important work by Keith 
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. I am grateful to the 
members of this symposium for their thoughts and contributions to this piece. I also want 
to thank Akhil Amar, Bruce Ackerman, Philip Bobbitt, Jules Coleman, Robert Fogelin, 
Heidi Kitrosser, Mark Kende, Timothy Knepper, Anthony Kronman, Sanford Levinson, 
the members of the Drake Law School Faculty Workshop, and participants in the Drake 
University Humanities Colloquium for their generous help along the way. Finally, I want 
to acknowledge Steven Gey, for whom the call for papers that generated this project is 
named. Though I do not know Professor Gey personally, I know and respect his work—
and I am aware that he is beloved by generations of his students—and so I am deeply 
honored.  
 1. David Lewis, Languages and Language, in 1 DAVID LEWIS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 163, 166 (1983).  
 2. I should note at the outset that I do not use the word “meaning” in the strict 
and narrow sense that Larry Solum intends in his Semantic Originalism. See Lawrence 
Solum, Semantic Originalism 2–4 (Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. While, as Solum notes, this may cause 
some confusion, I do not think his distinction between “semantic,” “applicative,” and 
“teleological,” meanings is helpful, largely because I reject the Gricean conception of 
“speaker’s meaning.” Meaning is always a shared or collective notion—in the sense that 
no assertion has meaning apart from how it is understood (Kripke, notwithstanding, 
there are no private languages)—no matter what a speaker intended. And, while there 
may be such a thing as “speaker’s intent,” we cannot hope to get at it without looking to 
the purposes and applications of an utterance, which is always a constructive enterprise. 
For these reasons, I also reject the thesis that there are “linguistic facts,” in the sense that 
Solum uses that phrase—at least in the cases of vague language that are of real 
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Whittington and Lawrence Solum approached this question by 
positing a fundamental distinction between the processes of 
“interpretation” and “construction” in our legal practices.3 Put in 
these terms, the question resounds with echoes of a much older 
structural debate about the role of the judiciary in constitutional 
government, and seems to hint that such a distinction, if real, 
might help us identify the boundaries of legitimate judging. As a 
dedicated puzzle-solver within Philip Bobbitt’s modal paradigm 
of constitutional theory and discourse,4 however, I cannot take 
the hint as offered because I do not believe that the legitimacy of 
a constitutional practice rests upon externally imposed 
foundational or normative theories—theories that seem to 
suggest that there could be one correct kind of connection 
between Lewis’s categories of “languages” and “language.” 
Instead, I believe that legitimacy in constitutional practice arises 
when we follow certain organic, internally generated 
argumentative rules closely enough that other practitioners can 
recognize and comprehend—if not always endorse—our 
assertions of constitutional meaning. This is not to say that I am 
insensitive to the attractions—the allure of objectivity and 
constraint—that normative theories present. Nor do I doubt that 
the interpretation-construction distinction can be an important 
part of a precise species of historical arguments about 
constitutional meaning in a limited class of cases. The point, 
rather, is that I do not believe that, in general, these kinds of 
objectivity and precision are definitive or limiting features of our 
argumentative practices—those social processes by which we 
currently decide upon constitutional meanings. But, I hasten to 
add, I do not accept that this final assertion relegates me to the 
 
constitutional concern. In all likelihood, my disagreement on these fundamental premises 
explains why I doubt the ultimate utility of the interpretation-construction distinction. 
 3. See generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: 
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Solum, supra 
note 2. 
 4. The not-so-clever reference is to Thomas Kuhn’s distinction between 
revolutionary “paradigm shifts” and “normal science” puzzle-solving. See THOMAS S. 
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10–12 (3d. ed. 1996). For the 
paradigm shift, see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982) (outlining a practice-based grammar of constitutional discourse 
grounded in six modalities of argument). For my attempts at puzzle-solving, see generally 
Ian Bartrum, The Constitutional Canon as Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 327 (2009) [hereinafter Bartrum, Constitutional Canon]; Ian Bartrum, 
Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s Theory of the Constitution, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 157 (2008) [hereinafter Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities]; Ian 
Bartrum, The Constitutional Structure of Disestablishment, 2 N.Y.U J.L. & LIBERTY 311 
(2007). 
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margins of contemporary theory, where I might commiserate 
with the legal realists about the vagaries of an unconstrained 
judiciary. To explain why, I must begin by briefly outlining the 
Wittgensteinian underpinnings of Bobbitt’s modal theory. 
One of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s fundamental purposes in the 
Philosophical Investigations was to reject the search for a unified 
account of language’s internal logic, which had occupied the bulk 
of his only published work: the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.5 
Rather, the later Wittgenstein suggested that language is not one 
activity, but a variety of different kinds of activities, each with 
different rules and purposes.6 Across the spectrum of these 
myriad “language-games,” the same word often serves a variety 
of different—though related—functions, each specific to the 
particular “game” within which it is employed.7 From this it 
follows that a word’s meaning often does not derive from some 
foundational referent in the world, but, rather, is determined by 
the use to which it is properly put within a particular language-
game.8 The properly part is critical, for it precludes the 
impossible suggestion that a word can mean whatever we want 
to use it to mean, and, instead, grounds the generalized claim 
that “the meaning of a word is its use” in a more specific account 
of what it is to understand and follow the rules of a language-
game.9 Without getting too deeply into Wittgenstein’s complex 
and controverted theory of how we identify, understand, and 
follow these rules, it is essential to remember that obeying a rule 
is also a social practice and “[h]ence it is not possible to obey a 
rule privately.”10 We can only know that we have successfully 
followed a rule—that we know how to use a word and thus what 
it means—when our usage is understood, or “ratified,” by 
another participant in the particular language-game.11 But, as 
 
 5. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11–12 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) [hereinafter WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS]. Here 
Wittgenstein introduces the concept of a varied “multiplicity of language-games” as an 
objection to “what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the 
author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)” Id. (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974)) . 
For a very helpful introduction to these ideas, see ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN 
107–30 (2d ed. 1987); A.C. GRAYLING, WITTGENSTEIN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
81–89 (1996).  
 6. WITTGENSTEIN, INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 5, at 11–12, 13, 31.  
 7. Id. at 31–35. Wittgenstein famously likened this “relation” to a “family 
resemblance.” Id. at 32. 
 8. Id. at 20. 
 9. Id. at 20, 79–81; accord GRAYLING, supra note 5, at 86. 
 10. Id. at 81. 
 11. For a discussion of “ratification” in this context, see PETER WINCH, THE IDEA 
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elements of a practice, the rules themselves will evolve as 
contexts and purposes change, and as individual participants 
leave their impact on the game. It is in something like this way 
that meanings change over time.12 
Bobbitt’s modal theory thoughtfully applies some of these 
insights about the nature of language to the contextualized social 
practice that concerns us here: constitutional law. He has 
suggested that we should understand the Constitution itself as 
analogous to a Wittgensteinian language-game—complete with 
its own internal rules or grammar—and thus the legitimacy of a 
constitutional assertion depends upon its grounding in the 
proper forms of argument and usage.13 For Bobbitt, six such 
argumentative forms or modalities—textual, historical, 
structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical—make up the 
constitutional grammar.14 To be clear, an assertion of 
constitutional meaning rooted in one or more of these modalities 
is legitimate, but not necessarily dispositive. It is up to the courts, 
the decision-makers in our practice, to choose among competing 
assertions at any given moment in time. And even a judicial 
decision may be only an impermanent resolution of 
constitutional meaning. After all, an ill-fitting decision—like an 
inapt word or metaphor in any language-game—may protrude, 
exposed, into the unforgiving flow of practice, and, if not 
formally revisited, simply wear away over time.15 On the 
contrary, other assertions of meaning—some judicially 
recognized, and some not—may settle so comfortably into our 
practice that they become seemingly imperturbable bulwarks of 
the growing constitutional edifice. And so, in this way, I suggest 
that we are all, as participants in the constitutional conversation, 
constantly constructing constitutional meaning—even when we 
are simply “interpreting” the text. But our construction is not 
 
OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 36–39 (1st ed. 1958). 
 12. I concede that these last two sentences are probably an extrapolation of 
Wittgenstein’s comments, though I think they are justified. For some related thoughts, 
see FOGELIN, supra note 5, at 121–22; Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities, supra note 4, 
at 188–89. 
 13. I think it is important to emphasize here that Bobbitt sees the relationship 
between constitutional practices and language practices as analogous. He does not 
contend that constitutional law is a language-game, or that it is, in some sense, its own 
language; rather the claim is that there are important similarities between the ways that 
we argue about (and thus understand) constitutional meanings and Wittgenstein’s usage-
based account of linguistic meaning. 
 14. For a more detailed account, see BOBBITT, supra note 4; accord PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). 
 15. I take the central holding of Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), to 
be an excellent example of this phenomenon. 
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unconstrained in a coarse realist sense. Instead, we are guided ex 
ante by the rules of constitutional grammar, and we are 
answerable ex post to a faceless and proletarian norm-giver: the 
practice.16 
From this perspective, I think we must reorient the 
discussion of interpretation and construction so that we no 
longer view the distinction linearly, as if it separated an initial 
analytic or foundational kind of inquiry (interpretation) from a 
subsequent synthetic or derivational kind of activity 
(construction). Instead, we should treat both activities—if we 
assume that they are, in fact, distinct in some interesting way—as 
interrelated and interdependent aspects of an ongoing effort to 
overcome the fundamental and inherently problematic 
relationship between linguistic vagueness and the law.17 More 
importantly, I do not believe either activity can actually reveal 
something a priori or foundational. Professor Solum’s 
 
 16. I do not mean to suggest here that we can derive a substantial kind of an 
“ought” from an “is” by looking to argumentative practice for guidance. See DAVID 
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton 
eds., 2000). Rather, the effort is to describe the grammatical rules that allow us to make 
legitimate assertions of the “ought.” I do concede that the idea of deriving ex post 
normative judgments from the long-term assimilations of practice may seem to blur the 
line between Hume’s categories, but I do not intend the term “normative” here as an 
assessment of “ought” in any thick sense. I simply contend that these assimilations 
establish the norms governing successful communication within the practice as it “is.” In 
this sense, then, I merely present an instance of Arthur Prior’s functionalist 
counterexample to Hume’s assertion: “From the premise ‘He is a sea-captain’ the 
conclusion may validly be inferred that ‘He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to 
do.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 57 (2d. ed. 1984); accord Paul Bloomfield, 
Prescriptions Are Assertions: An Essay on Moral Syntax, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 17 n.14 
(1998). 
 17. My intuition is that some exploration of the venerable and diverse literature 
within the philosophy of language on the problem of vagueness may be helpful to this 
debate. See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, Vagueness, 1 AUSTRALASIAN J. OF PSYCHOL. & PHIL. 
84 (1923) (giving an introductory overview of the problem); TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, 
VAGUENESS (1994) (surveying the subject). Consider, for example, David Lewis’s 
assessment of the complications that the vague kinds of language often used in ordinary 
conversation can present to the semantic logician:  
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no 
determinate truth-value. Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line. 
Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary 
between bald and not-bald, the sentence is true. Relative to other delineations, 
no less reasonable, it is false. Nothing in our use of language makes one of these 
delineations right and all others wrong. We cannot pick a delineation once and 
for all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider the 
entire range of reasonable delineations. 
David Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in 1 DAVID LEWIS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS 233, 244 (1983). These difficulties are, I think, only compounded when speakers 
use vague language deliberately, which certainly seems to be true of some aspects of 
constitution framing.  
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sophisticated argument notwithstanding, in most cases I do not 
think that an assertion’s “semantic content” can be understood 
in terms of “linguistic facts”;18 rather, meaning arises when both 
a speaker and a hearer identify and follow the applicable 
language conventions—which are, in turn, constructed through 
conversation over time. And so, in constitutional discourse, I 
think it is more accurate to say that today’s “constructions” (and 
their assimilation over time) will necessarily reshape and 
reconstitute the conventions—the Wittgensteinian rules—that 
govern tomorrow’s “interpretation.”19 This means that the words 
alone are often not resource enough to ground a definitive act of 
interpretation; we must also know a great deal about the 
constructed conventional context in which they were written if 
we hope to give an authentic account of speaker’s intent.20 And, 
once we are beyond the words themselves, it seems to me that 
we are taking the first few steps across the border between 
interpretation and construction.21 In this sense, then, a 
meaningful act of interpretation is, itself, constructive in ways 
that tend to undermine the distinction’s utility as a constraint on 
judges (although, again, the distinction may highlight other 
interesting features of adjudication). 
 
 18. Perhaps the most revealing statement of this position appears in Lawrence 
Solum’s A Reader’s Guide To Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin: 
“When we disagree about [semantic content] we are disagreeing about linguistic facts. In 
principle, there is a fact of the matter about what linguistic content is.” Lawrence Solum, 
A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 13 (Illinois 
Public Law Research Paper, Paper No. 08-12, 2008) available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1130665. I simply disagree on this point: quite often language—particularly 
vague language—does not refer us to some factual content; instead, it asks us to identify 
and employ certain communicative conventions. Thus, “linguistic rules,” not “linguistic 
facts,” are generally at the heart of our disagreements over meaning. 
 19. I take this to be a roughly Quineian kind of point. See W.V.O. Quine, Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism, 60 PHIL. REV. 20, 20–31 (1951) (demonstrating analyticity’s 
question-begging reliance on synonymy).  
 20. This much I take to be entirely consistent with Grice’s account of meaning—
particularly his work on implicature. See H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41 (Peter Cole & Jerry Morgan eds., 1975). 
Here I think Solum would agree. See Solum, supra note 18, at 12 (discussing 
constitutional implicature). 
 21. I recognize that proponents intend the distinction to separate our efforts to 
determine “speaker’s intent” (interpretation) from our efforts to create congruous legal 
rules (construction), and thus would likely argue that any constructive efforts to recover 
speaker’s intent rightly remain on the “interpretation” side of the divide. I would point 
out, however, that—in the constitutional context—some of the kinds of things we might 
consider once we get “beyond the words” include considerations such as “the speaker 
cannot have meant X because that seems to require absurd legal rule Y.” This kind of 
(perhaps inevitable?) argument seems to seriously muddy the interpretation-construction 
waters seriously. 
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I suppose that interpretation-construction proponents might 
argue that we do not need a fully determinative theory of 
original textual meaning to make the distinction a useful part of 
an originalist theory of constitutional meaning—and they could 
be right. In other words, as long as we can roughly agree on what 
competent speakers understood constitutional language to mean 
at the time it was ratified, then we have something relatively 
foundational on which to construct the legal rules applicable to 
modern controversies. (In Bobbitt’s terms, we might use 
historical argument to ground our doctrinalism). The larger 
point, however, is that our constitutional practices are analogous 
enough to our language practices that the same contextual 
variables which complicate theories of textual “interpretation” 
also complicate (perhaps to an even greater extent) the 
argumentative practices through which we “construct” legal 
rules. To be competent, or at least understood, within the 
practice, we must embed our assertions of constitutional 
meaning within the argumentative context that we inherit and 
inhabit—and original intentions are only one part of that larger 
context. And so, unfortunately, I think something is lost from 
the project the interpretation-distinction was supposed to help 
make possible: it can only rarely help define the connection 
between constitutional text and constitutional meaning; for the 
most part, it just gives us more precise means of deriving a 
possible connection. Ultimately, then, the distinction itself—
inasmuch as it helps make up an originalist theory—falls fairly 
squarely into the “construction” category. It is a tool we can use 
to help build the doctrine that (at least temporarily) bridges the 
gap between text and meaning. But it is just one of many that we 
might add to our practice and its norms—one which may or may 
not help to make up the context within which we understand 
future constitutional arguments or assertions. 
All of this is perhaps a roundabout way of saying, in a 
Bobbitt-inspired accent, that constitutional text is not the only—
nor often even a particularly helpful or determinative—source of 
constitutional meaning. On most occasions, indeed, in almost all 
the controversial cases, the text is barely even a starting point for 
a much broader argument in which we make assertions of 
history, structure, doctrine, prudence, and constitutional ethos. 
And it is this grammar, this evolving body of organically 
constructed rules and conventions, which establishes the 
boundaries of reasonable interpretation—not, as the 
interpretation-construction distinction seems to suggest, some 
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set of foundational “facts” about speaker’s meaning. Only in the 
most basic and uncontroversial cases, then, can we usefully 
describe the practice of connecting constitutional text with 
constitutional meaning as a two-step process, in which we 
establish an objective referent and then build out applicable 
legal rules. Rather, in the cases of most concern, we must both 
recognize and creatively employ the existing argumentative 
conventions to establish the boundaries of acceptable 
interpretation (this, itself, is constructive) and then make our 
assertions of constitutional meaning (construct legal rules) 
within the confines of the interpretive framework we have 
helped build. At every step along the way, then, making a 
successful assertion of constitutional meaning is much more an 
art than the science that the interpretation-construction 
distinction would suggest. 
In the remainder of this Essay I hope to illustrate one 
particularly powerful way that we can—through our very acts of 
argument—exert evolutionary pressure on the conventions and 
grammar that define legitimate constitutional argument. By 
creatively using, and thus slightly redefining, certain “canonical” 
constitutional texts, we can give new contours to the 
conventional context that establishes the boundaries of 
reasonable interpretive choice. These texts, which seem to 
resound so powerfully in our constitutional ear that they have 
hardened into part of the fundamental law, itself, both shape and 
are shaped by legitimate constitutional argument. In this way, 
the canon is reminiscent of another of Wittgenstein’s enduring 
aphorisms, in which he analogizes our knowledge of the world to 
a river and its banks: 
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not 
hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in 
that fluid propositions became hardened, and hard ones 
became fluid.22 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor is, I think, a very helpful way to 
visualize the relationship between the constitutional canon and 
constitutional practice. Canonical texts help to form the 
riverbanks through which our everyday arguments and practice 
must flow like water. But, while a competent constitutional 
 
 22. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 15 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von 
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969). 
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practitioner must remain within the canonical riverbed when 
constructing modal arguments, she may in turn—through 
perhaps subtle alterations in usage—reshape the constitutional 
geology over time.23 Importantly, this is not to suggest, as the 
realist might, that a canonical text can mean whatever one wants 
it to mean at any particular place and time. The practitioner still 
must use the text properly: she must follow the rules, and her 
usages must be understood and ratified within the relevant 
community, for her to make any legitimate assertion of 
constitutional meaning. The contention is rather that, as creative 
individual actors within a much larger creative practice, we can 
impact and grow the grammatical conventions governing 
constitutional argument over time, thus changing the ways that 
canonical texts are appropriately used and understood. 
In the longer work from which this Essay derives, I 
explored, in depth, three examples of canonical (or 
anticanonical) evolution in our practice.24 There I argued that 
canonical texts normally function as metonyms within the 
constitutional conversation: that is, we typically invoke them not 
to refer to their literal terms, but rather as shorthand for a larger 
set of associated ideas or principles.25 This metonymic 
conception, I suggest, makes these texts particularly susceptible 
to the kinds of creative usage that may lead to evolutions in 
meaning over time. The three examples I chose to explore—
Thomas Jefferson’s Reply to the Danbury Baptists, Lochner v. 
New York, and the Declaration of Independence—were meant 
to illustrate three distinct kinds of metonymic evolution, each 
accomplished within a different sphere of constitutional 
discourse. Further, I tried to identify each text’s “modal home,” 
or the argumentative modality within which it most often and 
comfortably appears. Thus, Jefferson’s letter derives from the 
historical modality, and is meant to illustrate a process of 
decanonization accomplished within the sphere of judging. 
Lochner, by contrast, emerges from doctrinal argument and 
exemplifies canonical refinement realized in the sphere of legal 
scholarship. The Declaration of Independence is at home in 
 
 23. To return to the reference with which I began, this relationship is not unlike 
that Thomas Kuhn describes between “paradigms” and “normal science.” See KUHN, 
supra note 4, at 10–12. 
 24. I explored many of these ideas in Bartrum, Constitutional Canon, supra note 4, 
at 311–90; some of the material herein appeared there first. 
 25. Id. at 329. 
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ethical argument and demonstrates canonical reformation within 
the sphere of constitutional politics. 
In this Essay, I explore the argumentative use and evolution 
of a fourth canonical illustration, James Madison’s Federalist 10. 
This text does not seem to fit quite as neatly into my earlier 
taxonomies, but this, perhaps, makes it all the more interesting 
as an example. I suggest that Federalist 10 has two modal homes 
in our practice—both in the historical and structural forms—and 
that at least part of its metonymic evolution has been to shift 
slightly from one home to another. As part of this process, the 
text has undergone two distinct phases of evolution, both 
occurring within the academic sphere of constitutional discourse. 
The first phase is one of canonization in the work of Charles 
Beard and his followers.26 The second phase—that of canonical 
refinement—occurred in the second half of last century, 
beginning with the work of Douglass Adair and concluding with 
Larry Kramer’s more recent revisions.27 In what follows, I trace 
the broad contours of these evolutions in metonymic meaning 
through the academic discourse and conclude with a brief 
examination of the impacts these changes had on constitutional 
argument, as practiced in the courts. In so doing, I hope to 
illustrate one of the ways that, over time, our arguments 
themselves shape the grammatical context that, in turn, defines 
the limits of reasonable interpretation and argumentation. 
HISTORY AND STRUCTURE: FEDERALIST 10 AND 
CANONICAL REFINEMENT 
James Madison’s Federalist 10 is likely among the first 
primary texts of constitutional theory the modern American high 
school student encounters, and, if her experience is anything like 
my own, it is presented as emblematic of the Founders’ 
structural insight into the moderating virtues of a pluralistic 
democracy. Framed this way, the text has powerful metonymic 
resonance in two distinct modalities of constitutional argument. 
First, it is used the make the structural assertion that an extended 
republic governed by multiple overlapping sovereigns provides 
 
 26. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 156 (Macmillan Co. 1913). 
 27. DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN 
DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS FARMER 
(Mark E. Yellin ed., 2000) [hereinafter ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS]; Douglass 
Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48 (1951) [hereinafter Adair, 
Revisited]; Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
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the best institutional protection against the destructive 
tendencies of political faction. Second, it is presented as 
evidence for the historical argument that the Framers and 
ratifiers endorsed this theory in the late 1780s, and that, 
wherever possible, we should endeavor to promote pluralism as 
an originalist constitutional maxim. But, in truth, Federalist 10 
has not always stood resolutely for these principles in our 
practice—indeed, for over a hundred years, the text had virtually 
no place at all in the discourse—and its future viability, at least 
as a historical metonym, is now in some doubt. Thus, as with 
many other canonical texts, Federalist 10’s meaning in 
constitutional argument continues to evolve, and, as it does, so 
do the boundaries of reasonable constitutional interpretation. I 
begin my description by attempting to locate Madison’s essay in 
its original historical context. 
The story of Federalist 10 begins in the late months of 1786, 
as Madison began to make preparations for the momentous 
convention to be held the following spring in Philadelphia. In the 
years following the British surrender at Yorktown, America’s 
leading statesmen contemplated the evolving political situation 
in the states with growing alarm.28 Their concerns were myriad, 
to be sure, but they fell into three general categories. First, there 
was a splintering of state political communities into increasingly 
strident groups or factions—at least partly the product of an 
empowering revolutionary ethos—which led to an explosion of 
conventioneering, and, in extreme cases, the kind of mobbery 
that would lead to outbreaks like Shays’ Rebellion in western 
Massachusetts.29 Second, and perhaps more troubling, were 
emerging abuses of the legislative power itself, as cabals in the 
state legislature (most notably Rhode Island) began to push 
through a smothering multitude of so-called “tender” and 
“paper money” laws intended to dilute the value of outstanding 
financial obligations.30 Third, there was the problem of interstate 
rivalry, as the spirit of state power and independence threatened 
to bloom into the kind of protectionism that might strangle 
commerce and doom the new American economy to perpetual 
debt.31 It was on the pretext of solving this final problem that 
 
 28. For an excellent discussion of this period, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 393–430 (2d ed. 1998). 
 29. Id. at 396–403. 
 30. Id. at 403–08. On Rhode Island, see GEORGE TINDALL & DAVID SHI, 
AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 297–98 (4th ed. 1996). 
 31. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 224–27 (2004). 
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delegates from Virginia and Maryland accepted George 
Washington’s invitation to meet at Mt. Vernon in 1785, out of 
which caucus emerged an invitation to all thirteen states to send 
representatives to a larger convention in Annapolis in 
September of 1786.32 When only five states showed up in 
Maryland, Alexander Hamilton—a staunch proponent of 
constitutional reform—seized the opportunity to propose a third 
convention the following spring in Philadelphia,33 this time fully 
empowered “to devise such further provisions as shall appear to 
them necessary to render the constitution of the Federal 
Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.”34 
Like Hamilton, Madison hoped to radically overhaul the 
Articles of Confederation, and he departed Annapolis 
determined to put together a comprehensive plan for 
constitutional reform. Earlier that year, with the aid of a 
“literary cargo” Thomas Jefferson had sent from Paris, he had 
begun an extensive study of previous attempts at republican 
government.35 Leaving Annapolis, however, Madison abandoned 
his historical project—apparently satisfied that the destructive 
tendencies of political faction had crippled all earlier republican 
efforts—and undertook an introspective examination of the 
American system.36 Somewhere in these investigations, most 
likely amidst the crates from France, it seems that he ran into the 
political musings of David Hume; in particular the Scotsman’s 
suggestion that it might be possible to establish an extended 
republic over a large area.37 This, for Madison, was a welcome—
 
 32. TINDALL & SHI, supra note 30, at 300. On commerce issues as pretext for more 
radical designs, see WOOD, supra note 28, at 473 (“Both trade conventions of the 
previous two years, at Mt. Vernon and Annapolis, were but devices to be used in the 
move to change the central government.”). 
 33. WOOD, supra note 28, at 473. 
 34. Alexander Hamilton, Address of the Annapolis Convention: 1786, in 1 THE 
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 335, 339 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 35. Kramer, supra note 27, at 626. For the fruit of this labor, see James Madison, Of 
Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369–90 (G.P. 
Putnam & Sons, 1900). 
 36. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 35, at 361.  
 37. It was Douglass Adair—whose contributions to this story unfold below—that 
first brought attention to Madison’s reliance on Hume’s work. See Douglass Adair, “That 
Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth 
Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON’S LIBRARY Q. 343 (1957). But see Edmund S. Morgan, Safety 
in Numbers: Madison, Hume, and the Tenth Federalist, 49 HUNTINGTON’S LIBR. Q. 95 
(1986) (questioning Madison’s reliance on Hume). For Hume’s thoughts on the virtues of 
an extended republic, see David Hume, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, in HUME: 
POLITICAL ESSAYS 221, 221–33 (Knud Haakonsen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) 
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though perhaps startling—thought. The accepted wisdom, best 
expressed by Montesquieu, was that successful democratic 
governance was possible only over a small, relatively 
homogeneous republic; and this adage often formed the 
centerpiece of provincial objections to a strong centralized 
government.38 For Madison, then, Hume’s suggestion was a 
paradigm shift, and he gladly undertook an exploration of the 
possible political benefits an extended republic might present.39 
Even during his intense study and preparation, Madison 
continued to work the political wheel in an effort to ensure the 
success of the upcoming convention.40 In particular, he pressed 
Washington, whom he knew to be sympathetic to the reform 
effort, to both endorse and attend the meeting.41 Madison well 
knew that the General’s immense national prestige would lend 
badly needed credibility to the endeavor, and would likely assure 
the attendance of those states that had forgone the Annapolis 
meeting.42 He also kept in constant communication with 
Jefferson in Paris, advising him of the developments leading up 
to Philadelphia. He sent his fellow Virginians at least twelve 
letters in late 1786 and 1787, and, as the anticipated convention 
drew near, he began to share glimpses of his emerging theory of 
faction in the extended republic.43 On April 16, 1787—with 
Washington’s endorsement safely promised—Madison revealed 
his recent thoughts to the General in arguing that the national 
government should have authority to veto all state laws: 
[A] negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of 
the States . . .appears to me to absolutely necessary, and to be 
the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions. . . . 
[A] happy effect of this prerogative would be its controul on 
the internal vicissitudes of State policy, and the aggressions of 
 
(1754). Many also see the roots of Madison’s argument in Book VII of Aristotle’s 
Politics. See, e.g., Peter Simpson, Aristotle’s Regime of the Americans, in ARISTOTLE’S 
POLITICS TODAY 109, 109–27 (Lenn E. Goodman & Robert B. Talisse eds., 2007); Ralph 
L. Ketcham, Notes on James Madison’s Sources for the Tenth Federalist Paper, 1 
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 20, 21 (1957). 
 38. See CHARLES DI MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS BK. VIII 124 (Anne 
Cohler, et. al eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748) (“It is in the nature of a republic 
to have only a small territory . . .”). 
 39. Madison, supra note 36, at 366. 
 40. JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE 
FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 39 (2007). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Madison, supra note 35, at 229–374. 
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interested majorities on the rights of minorities and of 
individuals.44 
Here is the germ of Madison’s theoretical addition to Hume’s 
thoughts: the peculiar advantage of an extended republic was the 
likelihood that an enlarged, and thus diversified, national 
legislature would temper the dangers of localized faction with 
the alloy of political pluralism. 
Just a month before journeying to Philadelphia, Madison 
outlined a more complete version of his new theory in notes he 
prepared in anticipation of the convention. In the final section, 
entitled “Injustice of the Laws of the States,” he further 
explained his counterintuitive notion: 
If an enlargement of the [republican] sphere is found to lessen 
the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of 
common interest or passion is less predominant in this case 
with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is 
apt to be felt and the combinations less easy to be formed by a 
great than by a small number. The Society becomes broken 
into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passion, which 
check each other, whilst those who may feel a common 
sentiment have less opportunity of communication and 
concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular 
States contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not 
to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits. . . . As a 
limited monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an 
extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small 
Republic.45 
It was in this way, then, that Madison believed he could turn one 
of the principal objections to a nationalized republic back 
against itself: rather than a great problem, enlarging the scope of 
democratic government was, in fact, a great solution. Through 
his studies, Madison came to believe that it was faction itself that 
presented the most fundamental threat to ordered liberty, and 
thus it was the control of faction that must be government’s 
central purpose.46 To this end, he began to put together a 
proposal that would radically restructure the central government 
in ways designed to implement his new theory of the extended 
 
 44. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), reprinted 
in Madison, supra note 35, at 344, 346. 
 45. Madison,  supra note 36, at 368. 
 46. See id. 
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republic, a proposal that Edmund Randolph would present in 
late May to the Philadelphia delegates as the Virginia Plan.47 
While many of the delegates undoubtedly believed they 
were assembled solely to address the deficiencies of the existing 
national government, Madison had come to believe that it was 
equally important for the convention to devise a plan capable of 
protecting “republican liberty” from “the abuses of it practiced 
in some of the states.”48 This was precisely what he believed an 
extended republic could accomplish—self-interested minorities 
that might succeed in disrupting state government would be 
drowned in the relative ocean of national politics—and it was for 
this reason that he saw a national veto over all state laws as 
imperative.49 Indeed, when Randolph and other delegates left 
the topic of state vicissitudes out of the early discussions, 
Madison rose to object and took the opportunity to give full 
voice to his new ideas. According to his own notes, he gave the 
following account of his recent thoughts: 
[Roger Sherman] had admitted that in a very small State, 
faction & oppression wd. prevail. It was to be inferred then 
that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. . . . The 
only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, & thereby divide the 
community into so great a number of interests & parties, that 
in the 1st. place a majority will not be likely at the same 
moment to have a common interest separate from that of the 
whole or of the minority; and in the 2d. place, that in the case 
they shd. have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite 
in the pursuit of it.50 
This speech marked the debut of Madison’s new theory among 
his contemporary statesmen, and—as discussed below—it is not 
at all clear than anyone other than Hamilton fully understood 
it.51 What is clear, however, is that the convention would 
eventually reject his call for an absolute national veto over state 
laws, which he saw as an essential mechanism of the faction-
suppressing extended republic.52 Even so, just four months later 
 
 47. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 20-–23 (Max Farrand ed., 
Yale Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1911). 
 48. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 130, 134.  
 49. Letter from James Madison to George Washington, supra note 44, at 346. 
 50. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 47, at 130, 134–36. 
 51. See generally Kramer, supra note 27, at 640–50. 
 52. Id. at 649–54. 
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Madison would present a more complete version of his theory to 
the general public in the tenth essay of a series that would come 
to be known as The Federalist.53 
The essay was first published in the New York Daily 
Advertiser on November 22 of 1787, and, though it was reprinted 
in two other New York papers—the New York Packet and the 
Independent Journal—over the next two days, Madison’s 
commentary did not enjoy wide circulation.54 Indeed, it appeared 
in just four other papers, only one outside of New York, over the 
course of the next year.55 And it is perhaps telling that, on the 
same day that Federalist 10 was first published, another New 
York paper prominently featured Cincinattus IV, the fourth in a 
six part series of editorials directed against James Wilson’s 
influential State House Yard Speech of October 6.56 As Bernard 
Bailyn pointed out, it was Wilson’s Philadelphia speech more 
than the Federalist that was “the most famous, to some the most 
notorious, federalist statement of the time,”57 and Cincinattus 
(likely Virginian Richard Henry Lee) was only one of several 
commentators to author widely publicized responses.58 By 
comparison, the Federalist essays garnered relatively little 
attention—less than a third were originally published outside of 
New York—and, of those that were, Madison’s tenth paper was 
not among the most widely reprinted.59 
Even after ratification, when The Federalist, as a whole, 
began to settle into constitutional argument fairly quickly, 
Madison’s essay on the enlarged republic was not among those 
that judges initially turned to for guidance on constitutional 
questions.60 While several early Supreme Court justices 
(including, notably, John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland) 
lauded the papers as definitive accounts of constitutional 
 
 53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 54. 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 542 (John P. Kaminski, et. al eds., 2003) [hereinafter 19 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF RATIFICATION]. 
 55. Id. The only out-of-state paper to reprint the essay was the Pennsylvania 
Gazette, which published it on January 2, 1788. 
 56. Id. at 281. 
 57. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 328 (2d ed. 1992). 
 58. See 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RATIFICATION, supra note 54, at 337–38 
(CC: 134) (annotating publication of and response to Wilson’s speech). 
 59. Id. at 540–49 (annotating publications of each of the essays). 
 60. For a thorough review of the early Court’s use of The Federalist, see James G. 
Wilson, The Most Sacred Text: The Supreme Court’s Use of The Federalist Papers, 1985 
BYU L. REV. 65. 
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meaning,61 Federalist 10 itself did not make its first appearance in 
a federal appellate opinion until 1969,62 and it would not turn up 
in a Supreme Court opinion until 1974.63 Nor, perhaps more 
surprisingly, were early constitutional scholars particularly 
drawn to Madison’s paper. Although many of the 19th century’s 
most influential treatise writers—including William Rawle,64 
James Kent,65 Joseph Story,66 George Curtis,67 and Thomas 
Cooley68— referenced The Federalist repeatedly, only Story gave 
any space or thought to Federalist 10.69 In exploring the 
preamble’s appeal to the cause of “domestic tranquility,” Story 
devoted three short sections (roughly a page and a half of his 
nearly 780 page opus) to an almost verbatim transcription of 
Madison’s thoughts on faction; although, in fact, he made no 
attribution or citation to Federalist 10 itself.70 And the law 
journals, though not nearly as prevalent or important as treatises 
in the 19th century, tell a similar story: it appears that Federalist 
10 did not make its first appearance in a scholarly article until 
 
 61. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819) (“No tribute can 
be paid to [the Federalist’s authors] which exceeds their merit.”); see also Calder v. Bull, 
3 U.S. 386, 391 (1789) (deeming “the author of the Federalist” superior to both 
Blackstone and Wooddeson); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 144 (1810) 
(Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he letters of Publius . . . are well known to 
be entitled the highest respect”). At least some of The Federalist’s initial influence 
probably arises from its relatively early publication: the first bound volumes came out in 
1788, THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN FAVOR OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTION, IN TWO VOLUMES (J. & A. McLean eds., 1788), while Elliot’s Debates 
did not come out until 1836, Madison’s notes were not published until 1840, Hamilton’s 
Works did not appear until 1851, and Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention 
only went to press in 1911. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 73. 
 62. Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing Federalist 
10 for the proposition that “our forefathers had sufficient vision to ensure that even the 
many must give way to certain fundamental rights of the few”). 
 63. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (citing Federalist 10 as evidence of the 
Framers’ fear that “splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant 
damage to the fabric of government”).  
 64. E.g., WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 109 n.8 (1825) (opining that the essays “contain the soundest 
principles of government, expressed in the most eloquent language”). 
 65. E.g., JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 290 (1826) 
(referencing “the high authority of the Federalist”). 
 66. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES v–vi (1833) (calling The Federalist “an incomparable commentary of three of the 
greatest statesmen of their age”). 
 67. E.g., 1 GEORGE T. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND 
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 417 (1854) (ascribing to The 
Federalist a “weight and power which commanded the careful attention of the country”). 
 68. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN 
UNION (1868) (making multiple references). 
 69. STORY, supra note 66, at 158–59. 
 70. Id.  
!!!BARTRUM-271-CONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANONFINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:52 AM 
26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:9 
 
1926.71 This, perhaps, helps to explain why Madison’s primary 
antebellum biographers did not find the essay worthy of much 
note or attention. Neither John Quincy Adams nor William 
Rives devoted any significant discussion to the specific paper, 
though Rives did recognize and applaud Madison’s innovative 
theory of the enlarged republic.72 For the first century of 
American life, then, Federalist 10 had virtually no place at all in 
our ongoing arguments about constitutional meaning. That all 
changed, however, in 1913 with the publication of Charles 
Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the 
United States.73 
Writing in the midst of Progressive battles with a 
recalcitrant Court, Beard hoped to “bring back into the mental 
picture of the Constitution those realistic features of economic 
conflict, stress, and strain, which my masters had, for some 
reason, left out of it.”74 Though certainly cognizant of the 
ideological implications of his work, Beard denied any 
underlying political motivations and claimed only a 
straightforward sense of historical curiosity: “In [my] stud[ies] I 
had occasion to read voluminous writings by the Fathers, and I 
was struck by the emphasis which so many of them placed upon 
economic interests as forces in politics and in the formulation of 
laws and constitutions.”75 And, in the course of those readings, 
his mind fastened particularly on Federalist 10 and Madison’s 
thoughts on the Constitution’s tendency to control faction.76 
Indeed, in Madison’s long-forgotten essay, Beard found a 
“masterly statement of the theory of economic determinism in 
 
 71. Forrest R. Black, The American Constitutional System: An Experiment in 
Limited Government, 10 CONST. REV. 35, 37 (1926) (citing Federalist 10 for the 
proposition that “the general opinion of the convention . . . [was that government should] 
secure private rights against majority factions”). My conclusion regarding Federalist 10’s 
absence from earlier articles is based on a search of the HeinOnLine law journal 
database. 
 72. See JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON AND JAMES 
MONROE 41 (1851) (referring to Hamilton’s Federalist 9 and Madison’s Federalist 10 
together, as a “consideration of the utility of the Union as a safeguard against domestic 
faction and insurrection”); WILLIAM C. RIVES, 2 LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 
488 (1866) (discussing Madison’s theory of the enlarged republic and mentioning that 
Federalist 10 “exhibits a power of analysis, and a depth and clearness of abstract 
reasoning, which have commanded the admiration of every intelligent reader”). 
 73. BEARD, supra note 26. 
 74. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES xx (Transaction Publishers 2003) (reprinting the introduction to 
the 1935 edition). 
 75. Id. at xviii. 
 76. Id. 
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politics.”77 In his argument, Federalist 10 spoke primarily to the 
dangers of class struggle and was fundamental and compelling 
evidence—the proverbial smoking gun—of the Framers’ 
devotion to propertied interests: 
Different degrees and kinds of property inevitably exist in 
modern society; party doctrines and “principles” originate in 
the sentiments and views of which the possession of various 
kinds of property creates in the minds of its possessors; class 
and group divisions based on property lie at the basis of 
modern government; and politics and constitutional law are 
inevitably a reflex of these contending interests. Those who 
are inclined to repudiate the hypothesis of economic 
determinism as a European importation must, therefore, 
revise their views, on learning that one of the earliest, and 
certainly one of the clearest, statements of it came from a 
profound student of politics who sat in the Convention that 
framed our fundamental law.78 
Beard went on to present Madison’s essay as the paradigmatic 
expression of the economic interests underlying the entire 
constitutional endeavor.79 
As a historical study, Beard’s work generally suffers from 
what David Hackett Fischer has labeled the “furtive fallacy”: the 
conviction that secret—or at least undeclared—motives lurk 
behind the decisions and events that populate the surface of the 
historical record.80 Given his belief that the Framers rarely made 
their economic motivations an explicit part of ratification 
rhetoric, Beard seized on particular language in Federalist 10 
identifying economic class as the “chief cause” of political 
faction—the primary evil the Constitution aimed to suppress.81 
He quoted Madison selectively—though not entirely unfairly—
to this effect: 
[T]he most common and most durable source of factions has 
been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those 
who hold and those who are without property have ever 
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, 
and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A 
 
 77. BEARD, supra note 26, at 15. 
 78. Id. at 15–16. 
 79. Id. at 156-59. 
 80. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARDS A LOGIC OF 
HISTORICAL THOUGHT 76 (1970). We might also fairly accuse Beard of committing what 
Fisher labeled the “fallacy of tunnel history,” the tendency to divide historical events into 
simplified and self-contained causal strands. Id. at 142. 
 81. BEARD, supra note 26, at 156.  
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landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile 
interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests grow 
up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into 
different classes actuated by different sentiments and views.82 
For Beard, Madison’s essay expressly revealed the Framers’ 
hope that an enlarged republic with a strong central government 
would better allow wealthier, propertied Americans to divide 
and conquer their economic inferiors. When in doubt, then, we 
should understand the constitutional text and structure as 
intended to protect wealth against coalesced class politics: “[The 
remedy] lies in making it difficult for enough contending 
interests to fuse into a majority, and in balancing one over 
against another. The machinery for doing this is created by the 
new Constitution and by the Union.”83 To Progressives, then, 
Beard’s argument used Federalist 10 as a call to radically 
restructure the Constitution. 
The book was immediately controversial and inspired 
vigorous criticism in high places. In the preface to his 1935 
edition, Beard recalls his swift condemnation by “conservative 
Republicans, including ex-President Taft” and a summons to 
explain himself to the New York Bar Association, which he 
declined.84 But he also had a devoted and influential following, 
and among scholars no one carried the torch more eagerly than 
Vernon Louis Parrington, whose three-volume Main Currents in 
American Thought85—which posited an enduring divide between 
Hamiltonian elitists and Jeffersonian republicans at the center of 
American political life—one scholar would later call the 
“Summa Theologica of Progressive history.”86 Parrington likened 
Beard’s work to “a discovery that struck home like a submarine 
torpedo—the discovery that the drift toward plutocracy was not 
a drift away from the spirit of the Constitution, but an inevitable 
unfolding of its premises; . . . [the Constitution] was, in fact, a 
carefully formulated expression of eighteenth century property 
consciousness.”87 Like Beard, Parrington found the true nature 
of these premises described in The Federalist’s “remarkable 
tenth number, which compresses within a few pages pretty much 
 
 82. Id. at 156–57, (quoting FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). 
 83. Id. at 158. 
 84. BEARD, supra note 74, at xx. 
 85. V.L. PARRINGTON, 1–3 MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1927).  
 86. Charles Crowe, The Emergence of Progressive History, 27 J. HIST. IDEAS 109, 
121 (1966).  
 87. 3 PARRINGTON, supra note 85, at 410. 
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the whole Federalist theory of political science . . .”88 The effect 
of Beard’s and Parrington’s argumentative usage of Madison, 
combined with the growing movement towards Progressive 
history, was to recover Federalist 10 from relative obscurity and 
elevate it to a place among those canonical texts that must 
inform our arguments about constitutional meaning.89 Indeed, 
discussion of Madison’s theory of faction appeared in more than 
a hundred scholarly articles between 1913 and 1950,90 as well as 
in numerous Progressive histories,91 and in several notable 
efforts to respond to Beard’s interpretation.92 
It was Beard’s use of Federalist 10 which both canonized the 
essay and established its initial metonymic meaning in 
constitutional discourse. As a symbol, Madison’s paper now 
stood for the Framers’ intention to create a constitutional 
structure that would protect private property from populist 
redistribution efforts. And, as Garry Wills observed, even those 
scholars who disagreed with the overall economic interpretation 
of the Constitution seemed to concede that Beard had 
interpreted Federalist 10 correctly: “[Neutral scholars] might not 
agree with Beard’s politics; but they often felt he had got 
Madison’s politics right.”93 As such, Federalist 10 emerged as a 
powerful metonymic tool in at least two modalities of academic 
constitutional argument.94 In structural argument, the essay stood 
for the proposition that the constitutional architecture protects 
wealth and the laissez-faire economy against potentially 
tyrannous proletarian majorities. In historical argument, 
Federalist 10 was symbolic of the Framers’ intention to craft a 
Constitution that embodied these principles of economic 
determinism. At this point, Federalist 10 did not make its way 
 
 88. 1 PARRINGTON, supra note 85, at 286. 
 89. See Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 48 (“[A]fter Beard’s book appeared the 
Tenth Federalist became the essay most often quoted to explain the philosophy of the 
founding fathers, and thus the ‘ultimate meaning’ of the United States Constitution 
itself.”); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST xv (1981) (“Beard 
first put Federalist 10 in the center of constitutional debate, where it has remained ever 
since.”). 
 90. This conclusion is based on a search of JSTOR’s “history,” “law,” “philosophy,” 
and “political science” databases, as well as HeinOnLine’s law journal database. 
 91. See Crowe, supra note 86, at 123–25 (surveying Progressive scholars). 
 92. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 106–11 (surveying responses to Beard, most 
notably those by Charles Warren, Walter Crosskey, Robert Brown, and Forrest 
McDonald).  
 93. WILLS, supra note 89, at xx. 
 94. I explore only the structural and historical modalities here, but there is certainly 
an argument that Federalist 10 so understood was also symbolic of the American free 
market ethos. 
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from the academy into the courtroom—indeed, given the 
metonymic meanings Beard attached to the essay, it is difficult 
to imagine a circumstance in which it would have come up at the 
bar—but it did take up a prominent position in the canon of 
academic argument, where it remained influential and largely 
undisturbed until Douglass Adair began to reexamine The 
Federalist in the 1940s and early 1950s. 
Adair, who staunchly opposed Beard’s ideas about 
economic determinism,95 began by writing a series of articles in 
the William & Mary Quarterly exploring the historical 
controversy over the authorship of certain essays in The 
Federalist.96 In 1951, however, he focused his attention squarely 
on Federalist 10 in an effort to recapture a more nuanced (and 
perhaps more sophisticated) understanding of Madison’s 
argument.97 It is instructive that, writing nearly forty years later, 
Adair could claim (on well-researched grounds) that Beard’s 
interpretation “still governs to a remarkable degree the 
contemporary view of Federalist 10, Madison, and the 
Constitution.”98 Adair then waded straight into battle with that 
interpretation, however, which he characterized as the view 
“that Madison’s Federalist theory expounded the doctrine that 
theories are unimportant in politics.”99 In other words, according 
to Adair, Beard saw Federalist 10 as compelling evidence that 
“political theory played [no] consequential role in creating the 
Constitution; speculation there was in plenty in the Convention, 
but it was land and debt speculation, not speculative 
thought”100—and, in this way, the Framers had forsaken the 
Enlightened democratic principles of 1776.101 
Adair’s response—which took him another six years to fully 
formulate—was to recover and present much of the historical 
context described above: Madison’s extensive and troubled study 
of ancient democracies, his reliance on David Hume’s work in 
 
 95. Adair’s doctoral dissertation, which remained unpublished—though widely 
read—for many years, is entitled The Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, and, 
as such, was a direct reply to Beard’s work entitled The Economic Origins of Jeffersonian 
Democracy. Compare ADAIR, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS, supra note 27, with BEARD, 
supra note 26. 
 96. Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist Papers: Part 1, 1 
WM. & MARY Q. 97 (1944); Douglass Adair, The Authorship of the Disputed Federalist 
Papers: Part II, 1 WM. & MARY Q. 235 (1944). 
 97. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 48. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 49. 
 100. Id. at 62. 
 101. See id. at 48 n.1. 
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political theory, and the sudden revelation of the enlarged 
republic.102 Adair argued that, “by tracing the development of 
Madison’s theory as he thought it out in the spring of 1787,” he 
could demonstrate two points conclusively: (1) the Virginian 
never subscribed to the “naïve doctrine” regarding the 
irrelevance of political theory that Beard had suggested; and (2) 
Madison’s ideas, “as abstract speculative thought played a 
significant role in the writing and ratification of the United 
States Constitution.”103 In particular, Adair pointed to the 
discovery of Hume—whose work “must have electrified 
Madison as he read [it]”—as evidence that a great deal of 
considered political theory lay behind the ideas expressed in 
Federalist 10.104 Further, Madison never suggested that the 
dominant economic faction would inevitably control 
government: indeed, the same checks that hinder other factions 
would seem to operate with equal force upon propertied 
interests.105 Adair thus used Federalist 10 to make his initial 
argument that Madison had far loftier considerations than 
personal realty and the suppression of class struggle in mind in 
1789. But, perhaps owing to his untimely death in 1968, Adair 
never seems to have completed his second argument about the 
impact of Madison’s theory on the Constitution’s framing and 
ratification, leaving that discussion to “a later issue” of the 
William & Mary Quarterly, which (to my knowledge) never 
appeared.106 But, regardless of this failing, Adair’s work in the 
1950s went a long way toward rehabilitating Madison’s essay as a 
richer and more complex symbol of constitutional meaning. 
Indeed, between 1951 and 1990, Adair’s work on Federalist 
10 was cited in more than a hundred scholarly articles, and his 
interpretation of Madison’s theory appeared in numerous books 
on history and law.107 Notable examples include Garry Wills’s 
Explaining America: The Federalist—the dedication of which is 
“To the memory of Douglass Adair, who saw it first”108—and 
Martin Diamond’s essays Democracy and The Federalist: A 
 
 102. For much of this discussion, see Adair’s follow-up piece on Federalist 10. Adair, 
supra note 37. 
 103. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 49–50. 
 104. Adair, Politics, supra note 37, at 351. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Adair, Revisited, supra note 27, at 67. 
 107. This conclusion is based on a search of JSTOR’s, Hein-On-Line’s, and 
Westlaw’s databases for the relevant period. 
 108. WILLS, supra note 89. 
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Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent109 and Ethics and Politics: 
The American Way.110 And, from the ripples Adair stirred, 
Gordon Wood would fashion a crashing wave in his 1969 opus, 
The Creation of the American Republic.111 Wood’s thoroughly 
researched account of the diverse intellectual spirits that guided 
the Founders in the time between independence and ratification 
presented a theory of Federalist 10—deeply indebted to 
Adair112—rooted in a complex and sophisticated understanding 
of historical and contemporary political philosophy.113 Wood’s 
book, as a whole, was profoundly influential and would 
eventually bring about the end of Beard’s theoretical hold on 
constitutional historiography.114 Further, his Adairian usage of 
Federalist 10 helped to embed the “democratic theory” account 
of the enlarged republic more firmly in the canonical riverbank. 
Thirty years later, Jack Rakove would take up Adair’s 
stated, but unsupported, second thesis by using Federalist 10 to 
argue that Madison’s theory of the enlarged republic was 
broadly influential at the time of the founding.115 According to 
Rakove, the theory was central to Madison’s arguments in favor 
of proportional representation, and was a decisive factor in the 
Convention’s decision to vote down the New Jersey Plan.116 The 
thought (which, concededly, did not carry the day) was that a 
larger democratic electorate—stripped of jurisdictional 
malapportionments—would provide the best protection for 
important minority rights. That Madison, with his considerable 
wisdom and influence, thus viewed proportional representation 
as “the groundwork” upon which the constitutional framework 
would rest was persuasive evidence that the theory of the 
enlarged republic was central to the Framers’ understanding of 
the Constitution.117 But, even before Rakove fleshed out this 
final argument, a refined, Adairian version of the Federalist 10 
 
 109. Martin Diamond, Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the 
Framers’ Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52 (1959. 
 110. Martin Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75 (R. Horowitz ed., 1986). 
 111. WOOD, supra note 28. 
 112. See id. at 505 n.51 (citing Adair’s work and noting that “[m]uch of the recent 
interest in Madison has been stimulated or anticipated by the work of Douglass Adair”). 
 113. Id. at 504–05. 
 114. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 349 n.19 (1991) 
(“Just as Beard’s Economic Interpretation controlled the historical vision of the first half 
of the century, Wood’s Creation has dominated the last generation.”). 
 115. Jack N. Rakove, The Great Compromise: Ideas, Interests, and the Politics of 
Constitution Making, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 424, 434–44 (1987). 
 116. See id. at 434, 442. 
 117. Id. at 429. 
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metonym settled into place: as a structural symbol, Federalist 10 
stood for the idea that the architecture of an enlarged 
confederation works to protect important minority rights from 
an overbearing majority; and, as a historical symbol, the essay 
suggests that the Framers’ designed the federal government with 
this theory of large-scale democracy squarely in mind.118 But, 
while this remains perhaps the predominant shape of the 
metonym as it is used in constitutional discourse today, in just 
the last decade, Larry Kramer began to chip away at the 
historical aspects of Federalist 10’s metonymic meaning. 
In a 1999 article entitled Madison’s Audience, Kramer 
questioned the influence that the theory of the enlarged republic 
exerted at the Constitutional Convention, or during the 
ratification debates.119 On the first count, Kramer argued that it 
is unclear whether any member of the Convention (besides 
Hamilton) had any real idea what Madison was talking about 
when he presented his thoughts on faction.120 Other than his own 
notes and a brief acknowledgement by Hamilton, none of the 
other surviving accounts indicate any comprehension of 
Madison’s theory as he presented it on June 6th, or later on June 
18th.121 Nor is there evidence that any delegate rose to support or 
object to the speech.122 Moreover, Kramer pointed out that the 
one structural mechanism Madison felt his theory most 
demanded—the federal veto over all state laws—failed to make 
its way into the Constitution, as drafted.123 From the 
contemporaneous record, then, it appeared to Kramer that 
Madison’s thoughts on faction had little influence on his fellow 
Framers. As to the ratification debates, the evidence seems to 
suggest that Federalist 10 itself had relatively little impact on 
public opinion. Kramer notes that, in general, “the Federalist 
Paper’s circulation was far too small to influence the debate,” 
and, even though two other commentators published similar 
thoughts, “theirs were isolated voices, and neither writer 
achieved widespread recognition or significant influence in the 
ensuing debate.”124 In fact, far more probative to Kramer was the 
general silence regarding Madison’s revelation: “[I]n all the 
 
 118. For another take on Federalist 10’s evolution through this period of scholarship, 
see ACKERMAN, supra note 114, at 221–29. 
 119. Kramer, supra note 27. 
 120. Id. at 637–48. 
 121. Id. at 645 n.141, 646. 
 122. Id. at 642. 
 123. Id. at 649–53. 
 124. Id. at 665, 666. 
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torrent of pamphlets and essays and articles that streamed from 
the presses—enough to fill many volumes—there are only the 
Federalist Papers and these two other essayists to suggest that 
Madison’s theory of the extended republic was part of the 
debate at all.”125 In Kramer’s view, then, Federalist 10 may have 
continuing value in structural argument, but its place in the 
historical canon is, at best, tenuous. 
In just the eleven years since its publication, Kramer’s 
article has made an appearance in nearly one hundred articles 
and almost as many books,126 including such notable works as 
Akhil Reed Amar’s America’s Constitution: A Biography,127 and 
Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People.128 Thus, we see that the 
processes of canonical evolution are constantly in motion. Once 
canonized, a text becomes a powerful argumentative tool, which 
we then struggle to harness to our particular causes. Indeed, 
precisely because a canonical text gives such profound guidance 
to the flow or shape of legitimate constitutional argument, the 
skilled practitioner must always account for the text’s impact on 
her arguments—even when she may not be able to marshal the 
metonym in her favor. It is this constant practice of distinction 
and analogy that I termed canonical refinement, and I hope that 
Federalist 10’s history in academic argument well illustrates the 
phenomenon. The essay, which lingered in obscurity for over a 
century, entered the canon with Beard’s 1913 historiographical 
bombshell, where it was used to symbolize a founding 
commitment to the protection of private property; this 
metonymic meaning remained largely in place for the next forty 
years, until Douglass Adair revisited the essay and used it to 
illustrate Madison’s commitment to democratic theory; and, in 
just the last decade, we have seen Larry Kramer refine the 
metonym even further. But, while I contend that the academic 
sphere of constitutional argument stands on its own and is every 
bit as significant and important as the advocative and judicial 
spheres, in the context of this particular Essay, I would be remiss 
if I did not make some attempt to account for the impact that 
these academic refinements have had on decisions rendered by 
the Supreme Court. 
 
 125. Id. at 667. 
 126. This conclusion is based on a search of databases on Westlaw and JSTOR.  
 127. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 43 n.95 
(2006). 
 128. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 404 n.9 (2009). 
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It should come as no surprise that Federalist 10 did not 
appear in any Supreme Court opinion written before 1913; as I 
argued above, the essay had virtually no place in constitutional 
argument—much less in the canon—before Charles Beard 
dusted it off for his economic interpretation. And, on a 
moment’s reflection, it is relatively easy to understand why the 
metonym—as Beard canonized it—still did not appear in the 
Court’s opinions over the next half century. In Beard’s usage, 
Federalist 10 symbolized the Framers’ betrayal of the basic 
American ideals announced in 1776, and was thus a call for 
constitutional reformation. In short, while Beard’s argument 
provided grist for the academic mill, his was not the kind of 
symbolic meaning the Court was likely to employ. But after 
Adair’s refinements—which refashioned the text as symbolic of 
a profound and innovative American democratic theory—began 
to take hold, we do see the courts begin to take up and use 
Madison’s essay in argument.129 In fact, it was for just these 
Adairian meanings that the 8th Circuit first invoked Federalist 10 
in 1969. Faced with a challenge to racially segregated schools in 
Arkansas, the Court cited Madison’s essay as compelling 
evidence that “‘equal protection’ [does not] depend upon the 
majority vote . . . our forefathers had sufficient vision to ensure 
that even the many must give way to certain fundamental rights 
of the few” in interpreting the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.130 Just five years later, the Supreme Court itself 
would call Federalist 10 into argumentative service in deciding 
whether a California law that required independent candidates 
for political office to disavow party affiliation for a year before 
an election ran afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.131 
In interpreting the scope of the constitutional language, the 
Court used Adair’s version of Federalist 10 to argue that 
“splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do 
significant damage to the fabric of government,” of which 
concern justified the state’s regulation of political candidates.132  
Since 1969, Federalist 10 appeared in fifty-six lower federal 
court cases and in sixteen Supreme Court opinions, including 
some of the most notable and important decisions handed down 
 
 129. For an excellent overview of these cases, see J. Christopher Jennings, Madison’s 
New Audience: The Supreme Court and the Tenth Federalist Visited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 817 
(2002). 
 130. Haney v. Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 410 F.2d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 1969). 
 131. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728–29 (1974). 
 132. Id. at 736. 
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over that time.133 Half of the Supreme Court citations came in 
opinions addressing election law, ballot access, or political 
speech questions, where the essay has been used metonymically 
to suggest that the “Madisonian democratic tradition” is at least 
“partly predicated on the expectation that voters will pursue 
their individual good through the political process, and that the 
summation of these individual pursuits will further the collective 
welfare.”134 But Federalist 10 also appeared in opinions 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause,135 the Free Exercise 
Clause,136 the Takings Clause,137 and the Republican Guaranty 
Clause.138 And, right on cue, Federalist 10 made an appearance in 
the most publicized and controversial opinion the Court 
rendered this term—Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission139—as Justice Kennedy used it in his argument for 
overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce’s 
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause.140 In each of these 
contexts, the argumentative use roughly corresponds to the 
metonymic meanings—both structural and historical—that 
Adair began to recover and refine in 1951, which suggests that 
the meanings attached to Federalist 10 within the academic 
sphere gave real shape to the conventional context within which 
the courts must interpret constitutional text. But, of course, the 
Court’s usage will, itself, refine the essay’s meaning in our 
argument over time. As with Wittgenstein’s river of uncertainty, 
then, the canon shapes the practice, but the practice, in turn, 
reshapes the canon. And all of this is evidence that—at least in 
the majority of controversial cases—bridging the gap between 
constitutional text and constitutional meaning is best understood 
as a perpetual and complex feedback loop between 
interpretation and construction, rather than the straightforward 
linear process the distinction, as posited, seems to imply. 
 
 133. Notable cases include City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 523 
(1989); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1072 n.7 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010). 
 134. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 56 & n.7. (1982). 
 135. Croson, 488 U.S. at 523 (Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 
U.S. at 251 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 136. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988). 
 137. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 138. Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). 
 139. 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010). 
 140. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 692 (1990). Indeed, Justice 
Kennedy makes almost the same use of Federalist 10 as he did in his dissent in Austin. Id. 
at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
Within our current practice, constitutional meaning often 
arises from argument and argumentative conventions, not from 
linguistic facts contained or described in the text. And the more 
we argue, the more our argument affects and alters the 
conventional context that makes this meaning possible. While I 
analogized this process to Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a river and 
its banks, it is also something like the observer effect described 
in Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty principle: the ways that we 
use canonical texts will change those texts’ meaning over time, 
and these changes will ultimately partially redefine the 
boundaries of reasonable interpretation. Because I view 
meaning in these terms, and not in the Gricean terms that seem 
to underlie the interpretation-construction distinction, I am led 
to doubt the distinction’s utility as part of a larger normative 
theory of constitutional adjudication. Rather than separating an 
initial analytic kind of inquiry (discovering linguistic facts that 
make up semantic content) from a subsequent synthetic activity 
(fashioning legal rules consistent with that content), I contend 
that, at most, the distinction describes two different synthetic 
processes. The first process finds us making assertions (within 
the appropriate modal forms) about the intentions or principles 
underlying constitutional text; the second process asks us to 
make modal arguments about the legal rules that should follow 
from these intentions. 
Understood this way, the line between interpretation and 
construction threatens to get very blurry indeed, and I suggest 
that it might be more helpful to understand the distinction as 
simply delineating different modalities of constitutional 
argument. Interpretation might correspond roughly to assertions 
made in the historical, textual, and structural modalities, while 
construction might match up with the doctrinal, prudential, and 
ethical modalities—and, in difficult cases, we will likely need to 
employ modalities on both sides of the divide. The advantage of 
viewing the problem this way is that it allows us to understand 
constitutional meaning as a product of the accepted conventions 
of argument, rather than as if it were a hidden treasure we could 
uncover if we had the right map. This, in turn, allows us to turn 
away from map-making and, instead, ask what I think are the 
right kinds of questions for constitutional scholarship: How do 
our arguments affect the constitutional grammar over time? 
What processes or techniques have historically brought about 
changes in our argumentative conventions and, thus, 
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constitutional meaning? These questions are best answered by 
description, and my hope is that such descriptions will help 
future practitioners understand the kinds of creative argument 
that changed the game in the past. One powerful technique of 
this kind involves efforts to refine the metonymic meaning of the 
canonical texts we use in our modal arguments, and this is the 
process I described relating to Federalist 10. 
I chose to examine Federalist 10 in this piece for two 
reasons. First, it is evidence of the impact the academy can have 
on the constitutional conversation. Second, because the essay is 
most often used in the historical and structural modalities, its 
metonymic evolution illustrates the effect that constructive 
processes can have on the forms of argument that we might 
associate with interpretation. This, I suggest, helps to 
demonstrate that our efforts to discover “semantic content” 
often depend on constructed conventions and meanings. Other 
illustrations might be more dramatic—compare, for example, 
Brown v. Board of Education’s metonymic meaning in 1970 with 
the symbolic Brown that featured prominently in the most 
recent affirmative action opinions141—but Brown seems more at 
home in the ethical modality, which better corresponds to the 
construction side of the distinction. As such, it does not seem to 
illustrate the constructed elements of the interpretive process 
quite as well. I can only hope that the story of Federalist 10 was 
both illustrative and instructive in this regard. And, in the end, I 
hope that it helped to make my larger point that it is the 
practice—not facts about the text, or any particular theory—that 




 141. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
747–48 (2007) (“Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not 
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these cases have not 
carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once again.”). 
